Home > IRQ, KUR > IRAQ: The eleven reasons to explain Barzani’s decision of Kurdistan Region self-determination (and the backfire)

IRAQ: The eleven reasons to explain Barzani’s decision of Kurdistan Region self-determination (and the backfire)

December 18, 2010

The following commentary is reprinted with permission from Roads to Iraq, intel blog.

The eleven reasons to explain Barzani’s decision of Kurdistan Region self-determination (and the backfire)
©  Roads to Iraq
December 18, 2010

Not only bad timing, but Barzani’s “Kurds self-determination” argument in the Conference of the Kurdistan Democratic Party started to backfire, and the result is an agreement between Allawi and Maliki (among other reasons, such as Muq­tada Al-Sadr to transform Iraq into an Islamic State, there are reports saying that the Lebanese Hizbollah’s members granted the Iraqi nationality). Signs show that Maliki started to ignore the Kurdistan Alliance’s conditions to support his sec­ond term (according to Al-Qabas, the Kurdistan Alliance renewed the call on Maliki to sign the conditions).

The agreement between Maliki and Allawi on the mechanism to lift the De-Baathification ban on the four Al-Iraqi leaders is already reported on the Iraqi media since three days ago (it was agreed that the National Alliance to attend the meeting but will not vote on the resolution).

But this means there will be a new crisis inside Al-Iraqiya political blocs, at a time when the debate within the Al-Iraqiya List on who will occupy the vice-president still continues, lifting the ban on Al-Mutlaq could pave the way for him to this post instead of Tariq Al-Hashimi, if the points system taken into account, since Al-Mutlaq Bloc inside Al-Iraqiya is much bigger than this of Al-Hashimi.

The eleven reasons

1 – The desire for split has gained a new spirit and momentum among the Kur­dish public opinion, effected by the international separation movements such the separation of Kosovo from Serbia, and the split declaration of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia, or even the split of southern Sudan (chances of success are 100% if the process of voting in the referendum 0f January 11 2011).

2 – The separation intentions did not take place during the past period, because of the lack of support from Washington which would lead to strained relations with Turkey. But after the recent tension in Washington’s relations with Turkey (because of Israel), Washington has given the green light to its ally Barzani in order to allow the U.S. to use the Kurdish-separation card to pressure Ankara.

3 – Tel Aviv coordinated with Irbil-Kurdistan to use the Kurdish-separation card to punish Ankara. Among the most prominent signs, is that Barzani’s comments timed with the normalization of the Turkish-Israeli relations, which is cur­rently created more differences than before.

4 – During the last period, Massoud Barzani, tried to keep the Kurdish-separation under reservation, because of the sense that he is unable to confront Turkey, whom he bargained with on the PKK separatism issue. Barzani no longer fears the Turkish threat, and thus he started to raise the separatist intentions again.

5 – The intentions of separatism is linked exclusively to Barzani’s “charisma” and his political ambitions, he no longer sees himself simply as the Head of the regional government of Kurdistan, but the Head of a State, and has decided to go a step forward in terms of calling for a separate state.

6 – The Kurdish — Kurdish competition, is one of the reasons that prompted Barzani to highlight the separation issue, because of the increase in the Kur­dish political forces started to threaten Barzani’s popularity and his political party. Add to this that the new generations that have grown in the Kurdistan region during the past twenty years, have become more interested in realizing the inde­pendent State of Kurdistan.

7 – The separation issue is another maneuver tried by Barzani aimed to cut a deal to freeze the separation issue in exchange for Kirkuk, and therefore, it is likely that the coming period would witness the offering of concessions from Baghdad to Erbil, in Kirkuk.

8 – Just an attempt to blackmail the three Iraqi factions (State of Law — Iraqi National Alliance — Al-Iraqiya List) to get more gains. Particularly, in the Kurdistan region a share of Iraq’s oil revenues, and allocate more of official positions for the Kurdistan Alliance.

9 – The independent Kurdistan is an issue required to deal with seriously. The eight years of Kurdish self-rule have been exhausted its purposes, as a result, the transition must go to a new formula indicates a new program for the Kurdish political forces.

10 – The political elite in Kurdistan has realized that the international develop­ments are in favor of independent Kurdistan. The Arab countries and the Arab regional ruling system is very weak and in a state of power-decline, adding that Iran is engaged in how-to-cope with the increased international sanctions. With the U.S. military presence in Iraq, Turkey will not be able to act in a large-scale military operation against the Kurdistan region.

11 – The separatism intentions has been agreed upon in Washington and specifi­cally among the Israeli-lobby circles, the Kurdish group, and the neo-conservatives-Republican leaders, in order to use the separation card to threaten and blackmail Baghdad to continue the U.S. military presence for an additional period until the Republicans complete righting their grip on the White House, which has become possible.

Indications show that the Conference of the Kurdistan Democratic Party will undoubtedly vote in favor of supporting the principle of self-determination for Kur­distan, and the consequences are:

– The Kurdistan Democratic Party will receive more support from Kurdish sepa­ratists parties.

– Other Kurdish political forces will try to take the same position of Barzani.

– Baghdad’s government will work to put down of separatism movement.

– The Iraqi political forces will try to target the Kurdish movements, which will lead to deepen the split among Iraqi political coalitions.

It is clear that the region will pick up the separation signals coming this time from Irbil, and will try to read the codes of these signals. Therefore, both Tehran and Ankara will try to coordinate to fail this separatism project, espe­cially as its consequences will not be confined to the territory of Iraqi Kurdis­tan only.

[End.]

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